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Syria’s Sectarian Quandary 
Without Solving Sunni Dispossession, the Geneva Talks Skirt around the Conflict 
Khaled Yacoub Oweis 
A U.S. missile strike against the Assad regime in response to a suspected chemical weapons 
attack may have lessened a fear of Russia among countries that nominally back the 
Syrian opposition. Renewed U.S. diplomatic engagement in Syria could relieve pressure 
on the opposition to accept a settlement at the Geneva talks, which would be little more 
than a facelift of the Alawite-dominated regime. The international environment has 
lacked the balance to redress the disenfranchisement of Syria’s majority Sunni popu-
lation – a root cause of the war. European states hope to employ their reconstruction 
funding capacity. But stabilization remains far-fetched without a political transition 
and an inclusive system that can end the Assad clan’s monopoly on power. 
 
Had the Syrian revolt toppled the Assad 
regime, it would have ushered in the po-
litical ascendency of the country’s Sunni 
majority. Since the 1960s, members of 
the Alawite minority have dominated the 
Soviet-styled security state – the lynchpin 
of Moscow’s influence in Syria. Russia’s 
military intervention since September 
2015 has been marked by cycles of bomb-
ing, paper ceasefires and new talks. During 
every round of negotiations, the regime 
and its mostly Iranian-backed Shi’ite mili-
tia allies continued to empty largely Sunni 
population centers that have been at the 
heart of the rebellion. The Russian air 
campaign hit the non-jihadist rebels hard 
and robbed them of backers. It helped the 
al-Qaeda offshoot Jabhat Fath al-Sham 
(formerly known as Nusra Front) absorb 
other components of the armed opposition. 
After bombing the non-jihadists into near 
submission, Russia – profiting from the 
diplomatic slumber in Washington – organ-
ized talks in Astana, the capital of Kazakh-
stan. The Astana talks split the rebels but 
might have freed up the main U.N. process 
in Geneva to pursue a political transition. 
The United States struck an Assad regime air 
base in April 2017, after chemical weapons 
killed at least 70 people – many of them chil-
dren – in the rebel town of Khan Sheikhoun 
in northern Syria. Some U.S. officials called 
the strike “a one-off.” It has not been fol-
lowed, as of yet, by any previously mooted 
U.S. measures, such as no-fly or safe zones. 
However, it signals that the United States 
might no longer be willing to cede Syria 
to Moscow and Tehran. The unchecked su-
premacy of the two countries in Syria has 
dampened the prospects for an inclusive 
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political arrangement capable of ending 
the sectarian conundrum. 
Russia Overshadows Geneva 
In December 2015, three months after the 
start of the Russian military intervention, 
U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254 
superseded the Geneva Communiqué – 
an international agreement for a political 
solution reached by Russia, the United 
States and other world powers in 2012. 
Resolution 2254 repeated the need for 
a transition but arguably diluted the focus 
of the Geneva Communiqué on setting up 
a Transitional Governing Body (TGB) with 
full executive powers, including control 
over the security apparatus. In addition to 
mentioning the TGB, the resolution called 
for the establishment of “credible, inclusive 
and non-sectarian governance” and the 
drafting of a new constitution ahead of 
U.N.-supervised elections. It also called for 
the release of arbitrarily arrested detainees 
but dropped specific references in the Ge-
neva Communiqué to provide lists of names 
and access to them, as well as the release 
of those detained for non-violent political 
activities. Practically nothing was achieved 
for those prisoners still alive – even after a 
report by Amnesty International that said 
between 5,000 to 13,000 prisoners were 
hanged in a single regime jail alone be-
tween 2011 and 2015. 
The U.N. resolution provided possible 
room for the regime to wiggle out of the 
TGB. However, U.N. envoy Staffan de Mistura 
said in a television interview in March 2017 
– prompting the regime to refuse him a 
visit to Damascus – that his mission was 
to bring about concrete power-sharing. He 
acknowledged that a transition would not 
be achieved if the current Syrian leadership 
remained in power and more people were 
simply added to the government. Without 
battlefield and/or Russian pressure on the 
regime though, few in the opposition ex-
pect the current talks in Geneva to bring 
about any real change to the power struc-
ture, in which largely Alawite elites hold 
power under the veneer of a rubber-stamp 
parliament and cabinet. Throughout the 
Geneva process, the mainstream opposition 
has continued to speak in the name of the 
revolt, but few harbored any illusion that 
the more the talks dragged on, the further 
they were from achieving the revolt’s goal 
of a democratic transformation. The oppo-
sition could not boycott the talks and 
appear intransigent in front of the inter-
national powers. Still, it expects to obtain 
little to assuage the Sunnis, who have borne 
the brunt of the killings and destruction 
in the regime’s crackdown on the protest 
movement and the civil war. 
Demise of Cross-Sectarianism 
The cross-sectarian nature of the revolt, when 
it broke out in March 2011, gradually gave 
way to an armed Sunni backlash. The mass 
killings of peaceful demonstrators and the 
deployment of a mainly Alawite militia to 
help crush protests fueled sectarian mobili-
zation. It opened the way to other massacres 
and more transgressions, such as sieges on 
mainly Sunni communities in strategic re-
gions, but also sieges on several loyalist towns 
inhabited by Shi’ites in northern Syria. 
The growing expansion of Iran in the 
region reinforced a sense of Sunni besiege-
ment. From this perspective, Shi’ite political 
ascendency in the post-Saddam Hussein era 
in Iraq was seen as having literally wiped the 
Sunnis off the Iraqi political map through 
collusion with Iran. The Sunnis of Lebanon 
were dealt a blow by the 2005 killing of 
Rafiq al-Hariri, the country’s best-connected 
figure in international politics and busi-
ness. A U.N. special tribunal in The Hague 
indicted five Hezbollah militiamen in the 
killing. In Syria, an Iranian “Shi’itization” 
drive even before the revolt was viewed 
by many Sunnis as a threat to what they 
regarded as Syria’s core religious identity. 
The proselytization focused on converting 
poor Sunnis, whose lot was made worse by 
economic liberalization that had mainly 
benefited the Alawite elite and their often 
Sunni business cronies. 
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The leaders of the initial protest move-
ment, which included women and activists 
from different sects, argued that the revolt 
should remain non-violent and non-sectar-
ian. However, paramount among many 
protestors was a determination not be dealt 
the same fate of the Hama uprising in 1982 
against Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, which 
was led by the Muslim Brotherhood. Sub-
sequently, masses of civilians – mainly Sunni, 
but also some prominent Alawites and 
Christians – were killed, jailed, disappeared 
or forced to leave the country without 
mounting much of an armed resistance. By 
the second half of 2011, anti-Assad Sunnis 
across Syria took up arms. 
Radicals Play on Sunni Identity 
Sunni attitudes hardened as Salafist radi-
cals, as well as some less hardline brigades 
backed by the Gulf, instrumentalized Sunni 
grievances. They highlighted Sunni dis-
enfranchisement and promised to redress 
the sectarian-tinged repression of Assad 
family rule. Still, many armed opposition 
groups made efforts to portray the revolt as 
“the revolution of all Syrians” (thaurat kull 
as-suriyyin). As recently as March 2017, the 
head of the mainstream opposition delega-
tion at the Geneva talks made a point of 
saying he was proud to have met an Alawite 
tank specialist fighting on the side of the 
rebels in Syria. 
On the pro-regime side, sectarian rheto-
ric abounded from the Islamist Shi’ite mili-
tias that Iran poured into Syria. The Sunni-
Shi’ite divide widened across the Middle 
East, propping up the internal support bases 
of the regimes both in Iran and in the 
Sunni Gulf states. 
The Wahhabi clerical establishment in 
Saudi Arabia as well as clerics linked to 
other Gulf monarchies contributed to the 
weakening of the civil core of the Syrian 
revolt by supporting Salafist rebels. These 
Salafists did not share the international 
jihadist ambitions of al-Qaeda, but they 
shoved off more moderate brigades. Among 
the most influential Syrian Salafists was the 
late Zahran Alloush, a skilled manipulator of 
religious symbolism. Alloush was among the 
senior jihadists and Salafist clerics released 
in mid-2011 by the regime. Upon his release, 
he founded, with Saudi backing, what 
became the Army of Islam (Jaish al-Islam) in 
Eastern Ghouta, an expanse of suburbs and 
farmland on the edge of Damascus. The 
group’s outreach on social media projected 
themes of Sunni dispossession by what it 
regarded as the apostate Alawites and their 
Shi’ite backers. Alloush rejected democracy 
outright. He was widely suspected of in-
volvement in the 2013 kidnapping and dis-
appearance of the “Douma Four” – secular 
activists who had taken refuge from the 
regime in the town of Douma, a Jaish 
al-Islam stronghold. Seeking to bury the 
civic activism in favor of a religious narra-
tive, Jaish al-Islam’s propaganda footage, 
spread on YouTube and on sympathetic 
Gulf television channels, invoked the 
Umayyad Empire as the zenith of a just 
Sunni rule. In order to rally more Sunnis, 
it falsely claimed that the Umayyads were 
a bulwark against an expansive Shi’ism. 
As Russian strikes hit residential areas in 
Eastern Ghouta, rebels briefly paraded 
captured Alawite civilians and soldiers in 
cages in the streets of Douma. Hit by a drop 
in support from Saudi Arabia, which came 
under U.S. pressure to lessen its role in Syria, 
Alloush dialed back his sectarian and anti-
democratic rhetoric and met U.S.-backed 
moderate rebels in Jordan. A Russian strike 
killed Alloush in late 2015, shortly after 
Jaish al-Islam had broken a siege on Eastern 
Ghouta and captured strategic hills over-
looking Damascus. On Facebook, some pro-
Jaish al-Islam posts prematurely celebrated 
the awakening of a regional “Sunni giant” 
and appealed to the Gulf states to do more 
to stop Iran and its militia proxies in Syria. 
But not all Sunnis are anti-Assad. The so-
called Islamic State (also known as ISIL, the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) has 
struck particular fear among what is left of 
Syria’s middle class. Many of them would 
rather have relative stability under Assad 
family rule than all-out chaos. An unknown 
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proportion of Sunnis who had remained in 
or fled to regime areas might have interests 
that align with Assad and/or prefer him to 
what they regard as an inevitable Islamist 
alternative. Others have been sitting on the 
sidelines or have chosen not to express dis-
taste for the regime for fear of retribution. 
Role of External Sunni Players 
Cowed by Moscow’s intervention, Sunni 
powers that initially backed the revolt 
all but dropped the rebels. The fickleness 
of the backing from Turkey, Jordan and 
the Gulf states demonstrated that they 
regarded the rebels as instruments of geo-
politics and not as allies in transnational 
Sunni identity. As soon as the ends of the 
external actors could be achieved by other 
means, the rebels would lose value in the 
power calculations and could be easily 
dropped. This contrasts with the more con-
sistent support the regime has received 
from Iran and Russia. 
Turkey 
Ankara projected itself as the main cham-
pion of Syria’s Sunnis but shifted toward 
Moscow in the second half of 2016. The 
shift, which remains marred by Turkish-
Russian differences over Syria, was aimed 
at securing Russia’s approval to prevent the 
militia of the Kurdish Democratic Union 
Party (PYD) – a Syrian subsidiary of the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey – 
from creating contiguous areas under its 
control to the south of Turkey’s border with 
Syria. Maintaining access to the Russian 
market and the ex-Soviet Turkic states also 
figured into the mending of ties. Relations 
between the two countries had deteriorated 
after Turkey shot down a Russian warplane 
along the Turkish-Syrian border in Novem-
ber 2015, which prompted Russian retalia-
tory trade measures. With the ice thawing 
between Moscow and Ankara, Turkey 
pushed the rebels to attend the Astana talks 
and abandoned its insistence that a politi-
cal solution would be impossible as long as 
Assad remained in power. Militarily, 
Ankara tried to steer the rebels away from 
fighting Assad. It prodded them to join the 
Euphrates Shield, a proxy force Ankara had 
set up around Syrian Turkmen rebels to 
contain the PYD militia. In 2016–2017 the 
Euphrates Shield captured the Syrian town 
of Jarablus on the border with Turkey and 
other areas held by the Islamic State north-
east of Aleppo during a push by different 
powers to take territory from the group. 
Jarablus became a resettlement outpost 
for refugees as well as rebels and civilians 
deported under surrender deals from cen-
tral Syria and elsewhere. Still, the regime 
advanced under Russian air cover in areas 
south of Jarablus, in apparent cooperation 
with PYD militia. The Islamic State operates 
mainly along the Euphrates basin in east-
ern Syria. The region, which had accounted 
for most of Syria’s wheat and oil produc-
tion, is away from the main north-south 
highway, along which much of Syria’s 
population and commerce is concentrated. 
Saudi Arabia 
By late 2016, the Saudi role in Syria went 
into deep freeze. Turkey filled the vacuum, 
attracting rebels who had relied on Saudi 
support. 
The Saudi inaction appeared due to the 
power struggles within the Saudi hierarchy, 
as well as Riyadh’s involvement in Yemen 
and a lack of clarity about the direction 
of the new American administration. U.S. 
President Donald Trump’s more aggressive 
stance toward Iran was music to the ears of 
many in the Gulf monarchies. The policy on 
Syria – other than fighting the Islamic State 
– had remained vague and unpredictable. 
Only days before the chemical weapons 
attack on Khan Sheikhoun, American offi-
cials said that Washington’s policy was no 
longer “getting Assad out” and that his fate 
should be “decided by the Syrian people.” 




The kingdom had been a reluctant hub for 
Syria’s southern rebels. Its political and 
business elite broadly saw the Syrian revolt 
as a destabilizing element that could em-
power the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria 
and Jordan. The counterrevolutions to the 
Arab Spring, as well as admiration for 
Russia’s ruthless use of its military in Syria, 
made the tribal-based Jordanian establish-
ment’s grip on power more tenacious. 
The authorities pursued a more security-
oriented internal agenda, pointing to the 
presence of local Syrian brigades that had 
pledged loyalty to the Islamic State near the 
border. Jordan pushed the Southern Front – 
a coalition of far less hardline rebels oper-
ating between Damascus and the Jordanian 
border – to send representatives to the 
Astana talks. In rare public remarks, the 
head of the Jordanian armed forces made 
it clear that Jordan would not stand in the 
way of Assad’s forces taking border posts 
that were captured by the rebels in the bor-
der province of Deraa. His remarks appar-
ently were interpreted by the Syrian regime 
as a signal to increase penetration attacks 
against rebel defenses in Deraa. However, 
in a change of the de facto pro-Assad tone, 
Jordan said that it approved of the U.S. 
strike as a “necessary and appropriate 
response” to the chemical weapons attack 
on Khan Sheikhoun. 
Sunni Disunity Marks New Scene 
Weak Opposition in Geneva 
Turkish pressure on the rebels to adhere 
to Moscow-led negotiations weakened its 
delegation in Geneva. In late 2015, a High 
Negotiations Committee (HNC) had been 
formed in Riyadh to represent the main-
stream opposition. The HNC is headed by 
Riad Hijab, a former prime minister who 
defected in August 2012. A strong person-
ality, Hijab instilled rare discipline in the 
opposition. As Saudi Arabia withdrew from 
the Syria scene, the balance in the HNC 
shifted toward Turkish-backed brigades. 
Nonetheless, Hijab remains influential. 
The most powerful group to make the tran-
sition from Saudi Arabia to Turkey was 
Jaish al-Islam. A little more than a year after 
Alloush was killed, one of Alloush’s cousins, 
an official in Jaish al-Islam, was in Astana 
serving as head of the opposition delega-
tion. The rebels attended two of three Astana 
rounds held by March 2017. They harbored 
no illusions about what they regard as Mos-
cow’s intention to perpetuate the regime. 
At best, they had hoped to decrease the 
amount of bombardment on their areas, 
but any slack in Russian raids appears to 
have been taken up by the regime. 
Rebel Splits 
Turkish tutelage over the opposition deep-
ened splits among the brigades on the 
ground. By March 2017 al-Qaeda-leaning 
commanders left the Salafist Ahrar al-Sham, 
the largest rebel group, and joined the 
former Nusra Front in a new alliance called 
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, Association for 
the Liberation of the Levant). Officials in 
Ahrar al-Sham put the number of defectors 
at 800, out of an estimated 17,000 fighters. 
But the defectors, who took with them 
an arsenal of armor and heavy weapons, 
comprised a battle-hardened core. Ahrar 
al-Sham’s leadership resisted pressure 
from Ankara to go to Astana to preserve 
the group’s remaining ranks, but they did 
not oppose the talks outright. Some in the 
leadership of Ahrar al-Sham saw the split 
as ending a sclerosis in decision-making 
that had been brought about by the schism 
between its al-Qaeda sympathizers and 
more nationalistic members. They argued 
that Ahrar al-Sham was now freer to join 
the mainstream political opposition, iden-
tify squarely with the revolt and draw a 
democratic vision for a future Syria that 
could lessen the group’s stigma in the West. 
However, the group’s overall command has 
balked at adopting such a vision publicly. 
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Jihadist Takeover Moves 
The freezing of support and popular dis-
affection with a revolt seen as beholden to 
its enemies provided a ripe environment 
for piecemeal jihadist takeovers of other 
rebels. The opposition’s failure at Astana to 
secure a significant reprieve from the air 
raids harmed the moderates. HTS painted 
itself as the last standard bearer of the 
rebellion. It used what it termed the oppo-
sition’s sellout to Turkey and Russia to rally 
its cadres for liquidating other rebel bri-
gades, as well as local figures whose pres-
ence had been crucial in helping curb 
Nusra Front’s heavy hand. Among them is 
Ahmad al-Alwan, a cleric in the town of 
Ma’rat al-Nu’man in Idlib. Members of HTS 
vowed in early 2017 to kill Alwan, who had 
stood against the Nusra Front’s attempts to 
ban certain religious practices for not con-
forming to its interpretation of Islam. A 
unifying figure, Alwan had links with the 
Free Syrian Army (FSA), the umbrella group 
of rebel brigades formed mostly by officers 
who had defected from Assad’s army. He is 
also a main figure in Failaq al-Sham (Legion 
of the Levant), a rebel brigade linked to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, which was represented 
in Astana. Ma’rat al-Nu’man became vulner-
able to a complete takeover by HTS after 
the group defeated FSA units in the rugged 
Jabal al-Zawiya region of Idlib in February 
2017. HTS’s advances set the scene for a 
major confrontation with Ahrar al-Sham, 
but they came to a halt after HTS became 
mired in unexpected battles with another 
jihadist group with links to the Islamic 
State. 
Scenarios for Sunnis 
The course of the Syrian conflict has given 
rise to the following three scenarios. They 
are not forecasts, and the scene could devel-
op into an amalgamation of all three. 
Assad takes all, but no stability: U.S. action 
against Assad would remain limited. The 
new U.S. administration would continue to 
cooperate tacitly with Tehran against the 
Islamic State at the expense of the rebels. 
An increase in inter-rebel fighting in the 
north could allow the regime to capture 
another key highway straddling the prov-
ince of Idlib that links Aleppo and the port 
city of Latakia. Under this scenario, Iran 
would affirm its position as the biggest 
winner from the upheaval in the Levant. 
The PYD militia would be in control of 
swathes of eastern Syria, but it would con-
tinue to cooperate with Assad. A jihadist 
takeover of the rest of the rebels would deal 
Syria’s Sunnis a similar fate as their Iraqi 
co-religionists. Little international atten-
tion was paid to the violence and abuse 
Iraqi Sunnis received from the state and its 
assortment of militias. The United States 
made vague proposals in March 2017 for 
“interim zones of stability” in the context 
of the fight against the Islamic State and al-
Qaeda. Such zones would do little to loosen 
the grip of Assad and Iran if they were con-
fined to the Islamic State’s main area of 
operation, which is in the east of Syria. 
If Assad regains the whole of the stra-
tegic axis from north to south, Syria’s sec-
tarian conflict is unlikely to end. In March 
2017, a pinpointed attack on a military 
intelligence compound in the central city 
of Homs killed a senior regime operative 
and scores of other people. The attack in-
dicated that HTS is laying the foundations 
for a hard-nosed guerrilla insurgency 
focused on suicide bombings and hit-and-
run attacks. The former Nusra Front (nowa-
days the HTS) accumulated popular resent-
ment in rebel areas for its religious dogma, 
heavy-handed intrusion into people’s lives 
as well as its launching of turf warfare in 
Idlib. However, HTS would have no shortage 
of recruits among Sunnis whose commu-
nities were brutalized by the regime and 
Russia’s bombing. 
Stalemate: Another scenario, made more 
plausible by the U.S. strike in April 2017, is 
for non-jihadists to reemerge with Arab and 
Western support. Washington might pur-
sue a two-prong strategy against Assad as 
well as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. Many 
SWP Comments 12 
April 2017 
7 
Sunnis were incensed at the Obama admin-
istration’s military focus on eradicating ter-
rorism by Islamist militants while taking 
no direct action against what they regard 
as the state terrorism of the Assad regime. 
The issue of Assad led to mistrust between 
the United States and the rebels. It limited 
broader Sunni support for the U.S.-led effort 
against the Islamic State in eastern Syria, 
which is centered on support for the Kurd-
ish militia. However, U.S. apathy toward 
the FSA has worked to the advantage of Iran 
and could affect Israel, which had struck 
Hezbollah in areas in Syria near the Golan 
Heights and close to the border with Leba-
non. In central Syria, rebels have been 
holding out against the regime and Russian 
bombing in the besieged Houla Plain. The 
fall of the region would allow Hezbollah to 
firm its grip on the province of Homs, which 
borders Hezbollah bases in the Lebanese 
Bekaa Valley, in a further marginalization 
of the Sunnis. 
Russia delivers Assad: The least likely out-
come is for Russia to engineer the depar-
ture of Assad and support a serious tran-
sition. After the gassing of Khan Sheikhoun, 
the West appears to have adopted a more 
hardnosed position toward Assad, and the 
United States could resurface as a heavy-
weight player in Geneva. Russia might be 
able to remove Assad and replace him with 
another Alawite figure. But the risk to its 
prestige and investment would remain too 
great if the Alawite-centric regime were not 
to last without Assad or amid democratic 
change. Russian support for the regime, 
however, could become too costly, forcing 
Moscow to look for an exit. The Kremlin 
appears to be underreporting to the public 
the number of Russian casualties in Syria. 
An increase in casualties, coupled with a 
deterioration of living standards in Russia 
and/or domestic discontent, could force a 
rethink by Moscow. If things go wrong for 
Russia, it could attempt a more willing 
accommodation of the rebels. Yet, it has 
continued to bomb them while it supposedly 
brokers a peace. A Russian raid in early 
2017 against an outpost for Jaish al-Islam 
near Turkey appeared to have been a warn-
ing to the group for its boycott of the latest 
round of talks in Astana. However, the 
rebels have their hardline rivals and con-
stituencies to consider, as well as the legacy 
of the revolt. They have largely stuck to the 
revolt’s demand for the removal of Assad, 
which – short of a change in U.S. policy – 
only Moscow could enforce. The opposition 
had signaled it was willing to cooperate 
with Moscow if it delivers Assad, such as 
leasing military bases in Syria. Constitu-
tional, parliamentary and transitional jus-
tice arrangements would also need to be 
negotiated to preserve the Alawites and 
other minorities under a Sunni ascendancy. 
European Strategy 
A new European Commission strategy 
document, adopted by the Council of the 
European Union in April 2017, foresees 
funding reconstruction if the Geneva talks 
produce a “genuine and inclusive political 
transition.” It does not define what such a 
transition should entail. Instead, the E.U. 
commission cited U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 2254 and the Geneva Commu-
niqué, which have no mandate to strip the 
Assad family or the Alawite elite from their 
pervasive tools of control. These include 
security, the official media, the business 
and smuggling monopolies, identification 
and property records, and the country’s 
kangaroo courts [for further reading on 
the Alawite crux of Assad’s rule see SWP 
Comments 52/2015]. The European strategy 
document ignores Iran, which few Euro-
pean officials believe is interested in any 
transition. The reconstruction offer risks a 
return to the European approach in Syria 
before the revolt. In 2008, three years after 
the Hariri assassination, European coun-
tries, one by one, began rehabilitating 
the regime as it touted paper reforms and 
played on its relationship with Iran and 
militant groups. A fundamental change in 
the regime and its plethora of frontmen 
and laundering outfits would also need to 
SWP Comments 12 
April 2017 
8 
take place. Otherwise, the contracts would 
go to the same officials and business actors 
responsible for the corruption and cata-
strophic governance before the revolt. Assad 
has indicated that he expects to have his 
cake and eat it. As the international con-
ference convened in early April in Brussels 
to discuss expanding aid in Syria and post-
settlement support to the regime, the 
regime’s planes supposedly carried out 
the suspected chemical weapons attack on 
Khan Sheikhoun. The Brussels conference 
was co-chaired by Germany, Kuwait, Nor-
way, Qatar, the United Kingdom, the 
United Nations and the European Union. 
Europe could end up contributing to 
Sunni abandonment through a rehabilita-
tion of Assad, starting with construction 
contracts that go to his cohorts. However, 
stability will not be achieved if Europe and 
other powers continue to regard Syria as a 
mere power struggle without considering 
the Sunni grievances that underpin the 
conflict. International concerns about the 
welfare of minorities in Syria have often 
ignored the Sunni majority, who should 
be the main group tied to the international 
commitment for an inclusive transition. 
In this regard, European countries could 
signal to the Sunnis that the EU’s cozying 
up to Iran is not open-ended, and that it 
would not reward Iran economically, 
regardless of the conduct of its militia in 
the Syrian war. European countries could 
sanction some of the numerous Iranian and 
pro-Iranian Shi’ite militias involved in the 
fighting on the side of Assad. It would send 
a rare message that Europe does not regard 
terrorism in the Middle East as being exclu-
sively Sunni. The U.N. Independent Inter-
national Commission of Inquiry on Syria, 
for example, lists among the foreign mili-
tias that overran eastern Aleppo in late 2016: 
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, its al-Quds 
Force, Hezbollah, Afghan militias and the 
Iraqi al-Nujabaa and al-Fatimiyoon militias. 
In Germany there has been official debate 
on whether non-humanitarian aid should 
extend to regime areas as part of a “stabili-
zation” effort. The chemical attack on Khan 
Sheikhoun might have dampened reception 
for this view. Nonetheless, a current in 
European circles in favor of the rehabilita-
tion of Assad has remained strong, despite 
the previous use of chemical weapons, in-
cluding a nerve gas attack on rebel suburbs 
of Damascus that killed hundreds in 2013. 
In a transition scenario, any aid offer 
should be conditional on strengthening 
local structures that operate at a distance 
from the regime, and under which manage-
ment and staffing of German-funded projects 
could operate relatively freely. Tight con-
trol on the local level and a chain of corrup-
tion that extends from the highest echelons 
to the streets have been indispensable in 
fueling the repressive nature of the regime 
as well as a major source of income for its 
cohorts. The regime would seek to restore 
its micro-control as Assad appears set to 
remain intact during a transition, and pos-
sibly afterwards. 
Although technical aid can be carefully 
crafted to avoid emboldening the current 
business elite, who are in bed with the re-
gime, any political overtures toward Assad 
would have more far-reaching consequences. 
It would imply renewed acceptance of the 
security state and, thus, would feed jihadism 
in Syria and possibly encourage radicalism 
among the refugees, estimated to be mostly 
Sunni, who have made their way to Ger-
many. 
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